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Summary 
This brief focuses on the role of the credit ratings agencies (CRAs) in the securitization process and the 
options for reform. Despite the recent financial crisis, most regulators appear intent on continuing to 
rely on CRA ratings for overseeing the institutions they supervise. Further, legislation in the US and the 
EU appears to be moving in uncoordinated directions, threatening the integration of world credit 
markets. Yet, the problems underlying the failures of the CRAs, and their consequences for financial 
efficiency and stability, are so complex and dynamic that policymakers should be very cautious about 
excessively prescriptive legislation because of the very real prospect of unintended consequences. A 
more subtle approach is needed.  
The proposal here is to establish a private Board with a public mandate to set standards and to 
encourage their adoption.  This Securitization Transaction Approval Review (STAR) Board of leading 
participants in securitization markets would have the mandate to improve the transparency of these 
markets and to realign the incentives of each agent, including the CRAs, with those of final investors.   
Introduction 
In the 2008 crisis, ratings of structured products proved to be more volatile and inaccurate than anyone 
expected, and this volatility had disastrous effects. Inflated ratings supported reckless investment and 
then, when reality forced a reappraisal, downgrades reduced portfolio values and forced asset sales that 
in turn further depressed asset values -- a downward spiral that was sufficiently prevalent and 
synchronous to contribute significantly to the depth of the overall crisis. 
                                                          
1
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To reduce the chances of such mishaps in the future, it makes sense to think about improving CRA rating 
accuracy, and also changing the institutional framework – including the structural features of the 
securitization process – to diminish the prospect of systemic spillovers from the securitization market.  
Accuracy 
Starting with rating agency accuracy, the agencies need good methods as well as the incentives to use 
them effectively. Today’s methodologies are almost certainly deficient and improving them will be 
difficult: improvements in accuracy will be difficult to develop, measure, deliver, and verify. Aligning the 
interests of the CRAs to those of the final investor will be difficult because the CRA business model is 
fraught with potential difficulties: conflicts of interest, information asymmetries, free-rider problems, 
concentration of buyers and sellers, barriers to entry, and many specific reasons why buyers’ and sellers’ 
interests diverge from those of the ultimate investors. Nevertheless, right now, there is a general 
alignment of interest between the many actors in securitization. They share a desire to rebuild market 
trust in the securitization process – a necessary first step to reviving an efficient market for securitized 
debt. Thus, there is an opportunity to create a private sector Board with a public mandate that would be 
responsible for conducting a Securitization Transaction Approval Review (STAR).  This Board should have 
broad membership heavily weighted to final investors to develop and promote best practices for the 
securitization process. That would emphasize requirements for CRAs to:  
1. Make public all the data that the sponsor of the securitization has provided to the CRA.  This 
would enable other independent experts, using different methodologies, to evaluate the 
credit risk of a securitization.   
2. Provide some indication of the correlation of underlying assets and the range of ratings that 
may result under a range of stress scenarios, and refresh this data as the pool of assets 
matures. 
The Board should establish standards for the alignment of the financial interests of the CRAs (and other 
participants in the securitization process) with those of final investors. 
In order to counteract the trend toward balkanization of capital markets that may result from the 
approach to regulation the EU has taken, it may be useful to include important foreign-based investors 
on the Board to establish standards of transparency that could be applied in all countries.  In any event, 
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since these markets are truly international in scope, it is appropriate to include major European and 
Asian investors in this market.  (More that 60 % of the subprime-related debt was placed with European 
institutions.)   
The work of the Board should be audited annually by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and 
its foreign counterparts, to ensure that it fulfills the mandates established by the Secretary of the 
Treasury (or the Financial Services Oversight Council of the Administration’s June 2009 legislative 
proposal). 
Systemic Issues 
When it comes to the effects of CRA ratings changes on the financial system as a whole, it is more 
difficult to know what the strategy should be. The development of a coherent and comprehensive 
approach should be high on the list of priorities of the systemic risk regulator. In the meantime, there 
are some obvious steps to be taken to increase transparency and remove perverse effects of regulation:  
1. Ratings agencies should publish the information and assumptions they use to calculate their 
ratings. 
2. The use of ratings in regulatory standards for banks and fund portfolio regulation should end. 
3. To encourage competition, the Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organization (NRSRO) 
designation should be abolished. 
The rest of this paper is divided into two parts. The first part provides an analysis of ratings agencies and 
their history, and looks at questions about their usefulness, how they developed their reputations for 
accuracy, the evolution of their business model, and how they came to lose their reputations with 
regard to the rating of securitizations. The second part discusses recommendations for reform put 
forward by the SEC, the EU and the Obama Administration. Against this background the 
recommendations for strengthening securitization ratings, as well as strengthening the securitization 
process, are put forward at the end of the paper.  
The Evolution and the Usefulness of Credit Ratings 
The credit rating agencies have been heavily implicated in the collapse of the securitization market and 
resulting credit crunch.  This has caused many private groups and policymakers to call for a variety of  
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Table 1.   The Big Three Credit Rating Agencies 
 
 
reforms, including even the abolition of credit ratings.  This raises two threshold questions: (1) what 
function have CRAs served? and (2) Do CRAs remain useful for the efficient functioning of capital 
markets?  I explore these 
questions in five related sections 
below. 
Are credit ratings necessary for 
the efficient functioning of capital 
markets? 
Clearly one can have capital 
markets without CRAs.  The world 
had active bond markets for at 
least 300 years before the 
introduction of the first CRA.  But 
these capital markets, which were 
largely based in Europe, traded 
mainly sovereign debt issued in 
the sovereign’s own currency.  For this sort of 
capital market, CRAs would have had little to add in terms of credit risk analysis. It is not an accident 
that the first CRAs were established in the United States, where a robust corporate bond market first 
emerged.  Since the mid-19th century, the US financed much of the growth of the railway industry and 
other infrastructure such as canals through the issuance of bonds by private corporations.  The big three 
CRAs all have their roots in the era between 1906 and 1913, just after a number of bonds issued by 
private corporations had defaulted or fallen in value.  (See Table 1 for a comparison of the rating scales 
and dates on which the big three CRAs were established.)   
Quality Fitch Ratings Moody’s Standard & Poor’s
Started 1913, NYC 1909, NYC 1906 Standard Rating 
Service.Merged with 
Poor’s to form S&P,
1941
Grades Investment AAA Aaa AAA
Investment AA+, AA, AA- Aa1,Aa2, Aa3 AA+, AA, AA-
Investment A+, A, A- A1,A2,A3 A+, A, A-
Investment BBB+,BBB,BBB- Baa1, Baa2, Baa3 BBB+,BBB,BBB-
Speculative BB+,BB,BB- Ba1, Ba2, Ba3 BB+,BB,BB-
Speculative CCC+,CCC,CCC- Caa CCC+,CCC,CCC-
Speculative CC Ca CC
Speculative C C C
Default D D
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What roles did CRAs play?  They facilitated investment by non-specialist lenders, diminished asymmetry 
of information between borrowers and lenders, reduced overlap and duplication of effort, facilitated 
comparisons across securities and, thereby, broadened access to capital markets.  Thus, based on 
historical experience, it would be possible to have capital markets without CRAs, but capital markets 
would likely be very different.  They might consist largely of sovereign issues, which required little credit 
analysis, and likely would involve a much narrower range of borrowers and investors.  Capital markets 
would be based largely on government borrowing and, inevitably, government allocation of capital.  
Some commentators have suggested that ratings could be easily replaced by credit spreads or credit 
default swaps, and while this certainly does introduce useful, forward-looking information into credit 
analysis, it does not solve the problem of how to evaluate the creditworthiness of illiquid securities.  
How did CRAs achieve their status? 
Why did investors trust the judgment of CRAs?  It was largely because they achieved a reputation for 
independence from issuers and underwriters, and they developed a track record for accuracy.  They 
brought considerable transparency to the market, and introduced a plausible methodology for 
evaluating credit risk based largely on the past performance of hundreds of similar securities, and 
statistics regarding the corporations that issued them.  Moreover, confidence was enhanced because 
the principal source of revenue for CRAs was the sale of bond manuals to investors.  Thus CRAs were 
profitable only to the extent that they added value to investors’ assessment of risk.  Over time, this 
created a natural barrier to new entrants.  The main way to gain credibility was to be successful for a 
long period of time, which made the market for credit ratings very difficult to contest.  Even before the 
SEC established the official category of NRSRO, the market was dominated by no more than two or three 
firms. 
What factors drove a wedge between the interests of CRAs and final investors regarding the accuracy of 
ratings? 
In the ensuing decades two developments tended to weaken the alignment of interests between the 
final investors and CRAs in the accuracy of the credit ratings.  The first was an unintended consequence 
of the attempt by regulators to outsource much of the responsibility for evaluation of creditworthiness 
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of the institutions they oversaw to the CRAs. The second event was the indirect consequence of 
technological change.   
Unintended Consequence 
In the wake of the Great Depression, national banks, state insurance regulators, overseers of pension 
funds and the SEC began to rely on ratings issued by the CRAs to control the credit risk taken by the 
institutions under their supervision.  This development subtly changed the interests of regulated 
investors in the accuracy of ratings, because by purchasing a security with an inflated rating they could 
reduce their capital requirements, or earn a higher return while still staying within the limits imposed by 
their supervisors.  As Frank Partnoy has observed, the CRAs began selling regulatory dispensations as 
well as information.  This pressure was intensified in the new millennium by two factors:  (1) the 
decision by the supervisors of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac could meet their promises to Congress for greater support for low-income housing through 
purchasing AAA-rated tranches of subprime-related securitizations.  This sharply increased a not-very- 
discriminating demand for AAA-rated, subprime securities that was met, in turn, with an increasingly 
shoddy supply.  (In the end, the GSEs held roughly half the AAA-rated subprime related securities.)  And, 
more recently, (2) the introduction of the standardized version of the Basel II minimum capital standards 
for internationally active banks, which relies heavily on ratings issued by the CRAs.  This has added to the 
pressure to inflate ratings so that banks could reduce capital requirements. 
The insistence of various regulators that their regulatees hold mainly highly-rated assets gave an 
important boost to the growth of the securitization market, an innovation introduced by Fannie Mae 
while it was still a government-owned financial institution.  The demand for highly-rated assets by 
regulated institutions far exceeds the supply offered by highly-rated corporations.  Indeed, the number 
of non-financial corporations receiving the highest rating has actually fallen markedly in the past two 
decades, from 50 in 1980 to 2 in 2009. Securitizations helped fill this gap by synthesizing assets that the 
rating agencies certified as equivalent to those of highly- rated corporations.   
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Cartoon 1.  The shift in revenue models raised 
questions about conflicts of interest 
Ratings issued by the CRAs also became 
increasingly important in private contracts, as a 
downward change in ratings could trigger calls to 
accelerate repayment of debt in loan agreements, 
increase collateral requirements in credit default 
swaps, force liquidation of collateral, and 
accelerate payment under guaranteed insurance 
contracts (GICs).  In periods of financial fragility, a 
downgrade could lead to a downward spiral for 
the corporation in question, possibly ending in 
bankruptcy. 
Indirect Consequence 
The second event which tended to undermine 
confidence in the CRAs was the indirect consequence of technological change.  Widespread use of 
copying machines, faxes, and, later, emails made it increasingly difficult for CRAs to generate sufficient 
revenue by selling bond rating manuals to investors to cover the costs of the infrastructure required to 
produce ratings.   During the early 1970s the revenue model of the CRAs shifted from one in which the 
investor pays, to one in which the issuer pays. This was seen by many as an obvious and potentially 
worrisome conflict of interest (see cartoon 12), but the CRAs generally were able to convince investors 
and their regulators that their interest in maintaining their own reputations  for accuracy far outweighed 
the temptation to favor issuers relative to the interests of final investors.  This may well have been true 
until the rise of subprime securitizations.  But at the height of subprime issuance, a mere handful of 
underwriters could bring billions in revenues to cooperative CRAs over time.  (This is quite different from 
the case in which a single corporation makes sporadic issues that are a fraction of the flow of revenues.  
Moody’s, the only free-standing corporation of the big three CRAs, made nearly half its revenues from 
subprime securitizations in 2006.) 
                                                          
2
 Taken from Stu’s Views, www.stus.com, used with permission. 
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By the time of the financial crisis, CRAs had amassed extremely broad powers over the financial system 
and the economy.  For example, they currently help determine capital requirements for insurance 
companies and commercial and investment banks, and whether securities are eligible for investment by 
public pension funds, mutual funds, and money market mutual funds.  Ratings also determine whether 
some financial institutions can do business at all.  For example, life insurers rated below the “A” 
category can scarcely write new business, and bond insurers need to be sufficiently highly-rated for their 
insured borrowers to achieve an improvement in borrowing terms large enough to justify the payment 
of a premium. 
How CRAs became NRSROs 
Oddly, despite the fact that the ratings of CRAs had been used for regulatory purposes since the 1930s, 
the SEC did not get around to specifying which CRAs could issue ratings that could be used for regulatory 
purposes until it devised the designation of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization 
(NRSRO) in 1975. This was done in a very opaque manner through the issuance of “no action” letters.  As 
a result very few NRSROs were authorized.  Indeed, the main way of becoming “nationally recognized” 
was to already be an NRSRO.  This system was reformed in 2006 with the Credit Agency Reform Act of 
2006, which attempted to make the criteria more transparent and ease the barriers to entry.  As of 2008 
there were 10 NRSROs, but the big three still dominated the field, and Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s 
remained the largest by far.  This left CRAs in the very peculiar position of claiming to be mere 
publishers of opinions, but opinions that have serious regulatory consequences.  So far they have largely 
escaped legal liability for their ratings under the protection of the First Amendment.  
The long period in which the CRAs operated before official intervention indicates that there is probably a 
strong element of natural monopoly in the ratings business, but more active use of anti-trust policy 
might have encouraged greater innovation in the industry.  A prime example is the acquisition of KMV 
by Moody’s in 2002.  KMV had derived forward-looking credit ratings from a radically different 
approach, relying on inferences of credit quality from stock prices.  The big three still rely predominantly 
on historical outcomes.  Although KMV decided not to undertake the costs of becoming an NRSRO, it 
was acquired by Moody’s and ceased to be a force of innovation.    
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Table 2. Multi-Notch Downgrades Undermined Confidence in Ratings 
 
It is not clear how the introduction of greater competition might affect the quality of ratings under 
circumstances in which the underlying data are not readily available to experts of all kinds.  While it is 
possible that more competition could increase innovation, lower costs and improve the accuracy of 
credit ratings, it is also possible that it could result in a race to the bottom as some CRAs compete for 
market share by offering inflated ratings to issuers who wish to borrow more cheaply, and to regulated 
institutions wishing to improve their returns without increasing their capital requirements.  
What ultimately undermined confidence in CRAs? 
What ultimately undermined 
confidence in the CRAs was 
their obvious failure to 
accurately rate subprime-
related securities, CDOs and 
other complex securitizations.   
Table 2 compares the worst 
year for multi-notch corporate 
downgrades – 2001, which saw 
the collapse of Enron, 
WorldCom and the largest 
sovereign default in history, 
Argentina – with the 2007-2008 
downgrades associated with 
subprime residential mortgage-
backed securities from 2007 to 
2008.3 
                                                          
3
 IMF Global Financial Stability Report, April 2008, Chapter 2, Structured Finance: Issues of Valuation and 
Disclosure, pg 61.  http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2008/01/pdf/chap2.pdf 
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Outstanding (in billions) 
Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) $1,100 
ABS Collateralized Debt Obligations $400 
Prime Mortgage-Backed Securities  $3,800 
Subprime Mortgage-Backed Securities $780 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities $940 
Consumer Asset-Backed Securities $650 
High - grade corporate debt $3,000 
High - yield corporate debt $600 
Collateralized Loan Obligations $350 
Total $11,620 
                  Table 3. AAA Tranches 6 Months Later 
 
Note that triple-notch downgrades 
of corporate debt are extremely 
rare, even in the worst year ever 
for corporate defaults.  Moreover, 
most of these downgrades were 
concentrated in the speculative 
class, which is defined to be highly 
volatile.  In contrast, triple-notch 
downgrades included nearly 68% of 
the investment grade (BBB-rated) 
subprime securitizations, which is 
often the minimum threshold of 
quality for securities that regulated 
institutions are permitted to hold.  
A casual inspection of the table 
may lead to the inference the CRAs 
had done a much better job of 
rating AAA tranches, but in fact 
that is only an artifact of when the 
measurement was made.  Because 
most subprime securitizations are 
tranched, it is necessary to rerate 
the lowest-rated tranches before 
higher rated securities can be 
analyzed.  As can be seen in Table 
3, six months later more than half 
the AAA-rated securities were 
Table 4.  Approximate total of Privately-Sponsored Securitizations at the 
Height of the Market 
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HH
Table 5.  The Collapse of the Market in Privately-Sponsored 
Securitizations in September 2008 
downgraded by at least three notches. 4 
 The contagion from these downgrades, which were widely anticipated in credit default markets, had 
devastating spillover impacts on institutions and markets around the world. It led to fair value losses at 
institutions holding these securities.  It made clear that the monoline insurers lacked reserves to back up 
their credit guarantees, which spilled over into the completely unrelated insured municipal market.  It 
raised troubling questions about the competence of the models that both the ratings agencies and 
expert practitioners were using to forecast risk and price these securities, and the ability of regulators to 
supervise them.  Because of uncertainty about which institutions would ultimately bear the losses, 
interbank markets virtually dried 
up, and securitized debt became 
almost completely illiquid.  CRAs 
have certainly made mistakes 
before –the Asian financial crisis 
and Enron were notable 
examples – but this was the first 
instance in which they had made 
a mistake with regard to an 
entire, important category of 
securities amounting to nearly 
$12 trillion dollars.5   
See Table 4 for a breakdown of an 
estimate of the stock of outstanding privately sponsored securitizations worldwide and Table 56 for the 
impact on new issuance of asset-backed securities in September 2008. 
                                                          
4
 See IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October 2009, Chapter 2, p. 17. 
5
 The fact that the total of all privately-sponsored securitizations – an order of magnitude near $12 trillion – must 
be estimated with considerable difficultly is an indication of how far the regulators have fallen behind actual 
market practice.  From Richard Herring and Edward Kane, “Financial Economists Roundtable Statement on 
Reforming the Role of the Rating “Agencies” in the Securitization Process,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 
volume 21, number 1, Winter 2009, p. 2.  
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Table 6.  Securitizations versus credit flows intermediated by 
depository institutions 2007Q2. 
As recently as 2007 in the United 
States, flows of credit intermediated 
through securitizations substantially 
exceeded those intermediated on 
the books of depository institutions 
(See Table 67). 
Reform Proposals 
This section reviews four reform 
proposals - the SEC proposals from 
the summer of 2008, the EU plan, the 
Obama plan, and self regulation – before 
proposing another way forward that focuses on the establishment of a best practices standard. 
The SEC proposals from the summer of 2008 
The SEC made three bold proposals to restore confidence in the CRAs.  The first set of proposals was to 
mitigate conflicts of interest.  The SEC proposed that the CRAs publish all ratings and subsequent re-
ratings to facilitate comparisons of performance across CRAs in a timely manner.  They also proposed 
that CRAs disclose all information used to determine ratings for structured products, including reliance 
on the due diligence of others, so that independent analysts could verify ratings.  In addition, the SEC 
proposed that the CRAs explain how frequently ratings are reviewed and whether different models are 
used for review than for the initial issuance of a rating.  Finally, they proposed to prohibit an agency 
from acting as both rater and paid adviser for a tranched securitization.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
6
 Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 382, “The Shadow Banking System: Implications for Financial 
Regulation”, by Tobias Adrian and Hyun Song Shin, July 2009, pg. 5. 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr382.pdf 
7 Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 382, “The Shadow Banking System: Implications for Financial 
Regulation”, by Tobias Adrian and Hyun Song Shin, July 2009, pg. 1. 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr382.pdf 
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The second group of proposals was intended to differentiate ratings on securitizations from those on 
ordinary corporate bonds.  As the triple-notch downgrades have made clear, the leverage embedded in 
many structured products gives such instruments a much deeper downside than ordinary bonds with 
the same rating.  The use of the same rating scale for each kind of product renders many of the 
traditional regulatory strategies obsolete and inevitably confuses all but the most sophisticated 
investors.  In the event of the crisis, it appears to have confused even some of the most sophisticated 
investors as well. 
The third and most radical group of proposals would have removed ratings from virtually all SEC 
regulations.  This would have curtailed the trend to outsource regulation of credit quality to private 
parties.  It is likely that it would have broadened competition as directors of investment companies 
began to rely on other kinds of analysts for advice, and it would have posed a useful challenge to other 
regulators who are relying increasingly on ratings by the CRAs – not least, the Basel Committee. 
In December 2008, however, the SEC adopted only the conflict of interest proposals and deferred 
consideration of the other two proposals indefinitely.  (It is doubtful that the most important of the 
conflict of interest proposals can be effectively enforced.  While it would seem desirable to prohibit a 
CRA from performing the dual roles of consulting on, and rating, a securitization, it is not obvious how 
this can be distinguished from the normal industry practice of the issuer showing several different 
hypothetical structures to the CRA until the issuer can achieve the mix of ratings they prefer for a 
particular pool of securities.)   
The SEC decided not to differentiate ratings for securitizations from ratings for corporate securities 
because it seemed unhelpful when the securitizations were virtually moribund and officials were 
struggling to rid institutions of “legacy assets”.   But the proposal was really quite timid and could be 
more justly criticized for avoiding the central problem.  Risk cannot be summarized in a single letter or 
number.  Risk indicators need to display a range of probable outcomes, and ratings of structured debt 
need to pay much greater attention to potential correlations within the underlying pool of assets.        
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The SEC decided not to remove most references to ratings from the SEC’s own regulations because it 
seemed inappropriate when other regulatory agencies were placing greater reliance on ratings.  This 
seems much more like enabling behavior than regulatory leadership, and surely needs to be revisited. 
The new Chairman of the SEC, Mary Schapiro, has recently proposed new rules to strengthen oversight 
of CRAs and to curb shopping for ratings by issuers of securities.  She has also promised to expand the 
number of, and improve the training of, supervisors for the CRAs.  In view of the track record of bank 
examiners supervising these same securities in the portfolios of banks, it is difficult to be optimistic that 
placing greater emphasis on supervision will improve the quality of ratings.   
The EU Plan 
By an impressive margin of 569 to 47, the European Parliament voted on May 6, 2009 that from 2010, all 
CRAs operating in the EU will have to register and be supervised in the EU.  EU institutions will only be 
permitted to trade securities which are rated by CRAs registered and supervised in the EU. CRAs must 
apply to the Board of European Securities Regulators in France for registration, and will be overseen 
day-to-day by colleges of national securities regulators.  The regulators will be required to impose strict 
rules ranging from disclosure of models and methodologies to corporate governance standards, such as 
the presence of at least two directors whose remuneration is not tied to the CRA’s financial 
performance. Underwriters of securitized assets will be required to retain at least five percent of the 
issue.  Questions remain regarding the consistency of application of rules across the nations that 
comprise the European Union, and if the rules evolve differently not just within Europe, but between 
Europe and the United States, there is a serious threat to integration of international debt markets.   
The Obama Plan 
Under the proposed legislation submitted by the US Treasury in June, 2009, credit rating agencies would 
be barred from selling consulting services to companies they also rate, and would be required to 
disclose any conflicts of interest.  They would also be required to disclose fees paid by the issuer along 
with each rating report.  In addition, they would be subject to “look-back” requirements to address 
conflicts of interest that might occur when an employee of a CRA shifts employment to a firm that he or 
 
 
 
Page 15 of 18 
 
This note does not necessarily represent the views of the Pew Financial Reform Project. All rights reserved 2009. 
Briefing Paper# 14 
Reform of the Credit Rating Agencies 
she had been involved in rating.   The CRA would be required to reexamine the ratings assigned to that 
firm. 
To improve transparency and disclosure CRAs would be required to employ different symbols to 
distinguish the risks of structured products.  In addition, they would be required to disclose additional 
quantitative and qualitative information along with the rating.  Perhaps most importantly, each CRA 
would be required to make available to other analysts all information received from the sponsor of an 
issue of structured securities.  Moreover, to discourage ratings shopping, an issuer would be required to 
disclose all the preliminary ratings it has received from different CRAs. The SEC would be given increased 
authority to supervise the CRAs.  In addition, the SEC would be encouraged to reduce reliance on ratings 
“wherever possible,” a much more timid step than the original SEC proposal.   
Self-Regulation 
In an important sense, this approach has already been tried.  Under the auspices of the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the CRAs adopted a voluntary code of conduct in 2004.  
It was entirely ineffective in preventing the problems that caused the crisis because the principles were 
quite broad, did not include a means of implementation, and failed to address the underlying lack of 
transparency and conflicted incentives. 
The establishment of best-practice standards8 
The government could convene a Board of leading participants in securitization markets and give them a 
mandate to improve the transparency of these markets and to realign the incentives of each agent, 
including the CRAs, with those of final investors.  This Securitization Transaction Approval Review (STAR)  
Board would be tilted toward leading institutional investors – pension funds, mutual funds, insurance 
companies, banks and endowments – but would also include various service providers – underwriting 
investment banks, originating lenders, lawyers, accountants, rating agencies and monoline insurers, all 
of whom share an interest in revitalizing the securitization process.   
                                                          
8
 This is a highly abbreviated summary of a proposal by Richard Herring and Allen Levinson, “Restoring Confidence 
in Securitization – Why and How,” May 2009. 
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Investors would be assured that each new securitization awarded the STAR standard meets industry-
wide best practices for transparency, due diligence, and communication of all relevant details to 
prospective and ongoing investors, and that all service providers have financial incentives that align their 
interests with those of the investors in the transaction. If the STAR approach successfully minimizes the 
risks of the securitization process, market forces will lead to efficient pricing of securities based on the 
fundamental risks inherent in the underlying collateral and the associated tranching of the various 
securities, without adding the large uncertainty premium for the process itself, which now exists.   
The key to the STAR evaluation is the establishment of explicit best practice hurdles for all service 
providers.  Following is a starting point for discussion of such best practices, which the Board would, of 
course, refine.  For example, CRAs would continue to opine on the credit quality of the securities based 
on their own criteria, but would be subject to three rigorous transparency requirements:  (1) full 
disclosure of the assumptions that were used in assigning the rating; (2) full disclosure of all information 
received from the sponsor of the securitization; and (3) disclosure of the stress tests designed to provide 
insight into the likely stability of the rating in response to changes in assumptions.  (CRAs would not be 
required to disclose the details of their models because this is proprietary information and CRAs should 
be given incentives to improve the accuracy of these models.)   
Moreover, as rating agencies need to be heavily scrutinized concerning their assumptions about 
correlations in the underlying collateral, lawyers and underwriting investment bankers would be 
required to assume an affirmative obligation to look for and report any undisclosed correlations in the 
underlying collateral, or structural anomalies in the securitization that could adversely affect 
performance. Most importantly, to financially align incentives between service providers and investors, 
fees paid to regular service providers would be paid pro-rata, gradually, in line with return of principal to 
investors, so that service providers would be putting their fees at risk in the event of defaults in the 
underlying loans held as collateral, and would share in the economic risks of the transaction as partners 
with the investors.   
This simple approach to aligning the interests of agents with those of final investors is likely to be less 
effective and possibly perverse with regard to CRAs.  They are making probabilistic assessments of the 
likelihood of default on securities or tranches of securities that differ widely in quality.  Their incentive 
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structure should encourage them to provide the most accurate assessment of the probability when a 
security is issued, and to change that assessment as soon as conditions warrant. Perhaps the most 
effective way to achieve that goal is through heightened transparency that will permit other experts to 
provide alternative assessments based on their own methodologies.  Over time market participants can 
judge which experts are pricing market outcomes most accurately, and their ratings will be worth more 
to issuers because they will reduce uncertainty to final investors and enable them to borrow on more 
favorable terms. 
The government should remove ratings from all regulations to diminish this source of pressure for grade 
inflation, and make it possible for other kinds of experts to advise investors regarding the quality of 
credits when useful.  To be effective this removal of ratings from the regulatory process should include 
state-regulated firms as well. The Government Accountability Office would be required to report 
annually to Congress on how effectively the Board has implemented the government’s mandate to 
enhance transparency and better align the interests of the participants in the securitization process with 
those of investors. 
Conclusion 
In view of the widespread criticism of the performance of the CRAs before and during the credit crisis, it 
is surprising that we still lack consensus about how they should be reformed.  Legislation in the US and 
the EU appears to be moving in uncoordinated directions, threatening the integration of world credit 
markets.  Moreover, neither legislative approach deals effectively with the root problems of improving 
the transparency of the ratings process, and realigning the incentives of the CRAs with those of final 
investors.  Worse still, most regulators appear to intend to continue to rely on CRA ratings for 
overseeing the institutions they supervise.  This not only undermines incentives for independent analysis 
by regulators and regulated investors, but also it also leads to pressures on CRAs to inflate ratings.  The 
quasi-official status of CRAs arguably undermines their effectiveness.   
All participants in the securitization process have strong incentives to restore confidence in the process.  
This may be one problem that can handled by setting ground rules – improving transparency and 
aligning incentives of agents with final investors – and leaving the details of implementation to those 
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who best understand these markets.  Moreover, if the Board included foreign-based institutional 
investors, it might become a market-based alternative to the EU approach. 
